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Should an FSA Check the IEC 61511 Cyber Security Risk Assessment?

An FSA team is often handed a SIS file with no cyber evidence in it. Here is how to test whether the security risk assessment exists, is current and ties to IEC 62443-3-2 zones and conduits.

17 Nov 20267 min readTVC Functional Safety Services

An FSA team opens the SIS file and finds a HAZOP, a LOPA, SIL verification calculations and proof test procedures. There is no sign of a cyber security assessment, or there is a spreadsheet from the original project that nobody has touched since. The question is whether the assessor should raise it, and what evidence to ask for. This article sets out how to test the IEC 61511 cyber security risk assessment during an FSA or audit, and who should provide the evidence.

Is cyber security within the scope of an FSA?

Yes, as far as IEC 61511 Edition 2 is concerned. TÜV Rheinland's summary of the second edition quotes the requirement that a security risk assessment shall be carried out to identify the security vulnerabilities of the SIS. Practitioner sources usually cite this as clause 8.2.4, within the hazard and risk assessment phase.

A 2016 IChemE Hazards paper on Edition 2 makes two relevant points. Edition 2 brings cyber security into the standard, and it makes periodic stage 4 functional safety assessments mandatory. Put together, an operating-phase FSA is a natural place to ask whether the security assessment exists. HIMA's interview on Edition 2 adds that these assessments are needed periodically in operation and whenever the plant is modified.

An FSA is not a penetration test or an IT audit. The assessor is not judging whether the firewall rules are good. The assessor is checking that the lifecycle evidence the standard asks for is present, current and traceable. Anyone conducting FSAs should also update their checklists to follow Edition 2.

What an IEC 61511 cyber security risk assessment must show

The standard sets the requirement but not the method. One practitioner analysis notes that IEC 61511 does not say how to carry out the assessment, and that IEC 62443-3-2 provides a suitable methodology. ISA-TR84.00.09 is the ISA technical report that integrates cybersecurity into the safety lifecycle, including risk assessment.

A published summary of clause 8.2.4 lists what the assessment should cover:

  • the devices in scope;
  • threats from both deliberate attack and human error;
  • the consequences and likelihood of security events;
  • every lifecycle phase from design to decommissioning;
  • any additional risk reduction needed, and the measures taken.

This list comes from a secondary summary, so check it against your own copy of the standard. The FSA questions below are written to be checked against that clause text.

Testing whether the assessment exists, is current and is linked

Three questions cover most of what an assessor needs. Each one calls for a document or a record, not a verbal assurance.

1. Does it exist?

Ask for the assessment report and its scope statement. The scope should name the SIS, the BPCS and any other devices connected to it. If the only evidence is a corporate IT risk register or a vendor's generic security statement, the assessment has not been shown to exist for this SIS. HIMA's interview is clear that the plant operator, not the safety system vendor, is responsible for the security risk analysis.

2. Is it current?

Look at the revision history against the plant change record. Has the assessment been revisited after a SIS modification, a network change, a new remote access route or a supplier change? A worked example on IEC 62443-3-2 suggests reviewing the assessment after plant or supplier changes. It also suggests asking whether the documented zones still match the live network and whether any direct connections bypass the intended conduits.

An assessment last signed off at commissioning, with several management-of-change records since, is a finding. It is a documentation finding rather than proof of a vulnerability, but it needs an owner and a date for closure.

3. Is it linked to IEC 62443-3-2 zones and conduits?

IEC 62443-3-2:2020 covers defining the system under consideration, partitioning it into zones and conduits, assessing risk for each, setting target security levels (SL-T) and documenting the security requirements. In the standard's model, a zone is a grouping of assets based on risk, and conduits carry communication between zones.

For the FSA, the useful test is traceability. Ask the team to show:

  1. where the SIS logic solver, engineering workstation and field interfaces sit in the zone and conduit diagram;
  2. the SL-T assigned to those zones and conduits, and the risk reasoning behind it;
  3. the countermeasure list for each, with status;
  4. how the cyber-initiated scenarios feed back into the HAZOP or LOPA.

One IEC 62443 guide describes the detailed assessment output as an SL-T, residual risk and countermeasure list per zone and conduit. That is a reasonable thing to look for in the file.

Who should supply the evidence?

The evidence sits with several functions, and the FSA often stalls because nobody has been told which one to approach. A practical split follows. It is a suggestion for organising the audit, not a requirement of either standard.

  • Functional safety or process safety engineer: the SIS safety lifecycle file, the link to the HAZOP and LOPA, management of change records and the FSA findings log.
  • Control and instrument engineer: the SIS and BPCS asset inventory, configuration and connection details, and the safety manual.
  • OT security engineer: the zone and conduit model, network diagrams, firewall and remote access rules, and the countermeasure status.
  • Site or asset management: the evidence that someone is accountable, that the work is resourced and that open actions are tracked.
  • Suppliers and integrators: product security documentation and support information. Their input feeds the operator's assessment but does not replace it.

ISA-TR84.00.09 guidance summarised by one source recommends running the assessment with process safety, control and security engineers together. If your FSA finds that these groups have never shared a document, that is a useful finding in itself.

Why the regulatory picture matters for the evidence trail

Many plants rely on products from manufacturers who are now subject to the EU Cyber Resilience Act. Manufacturer reporting obligations for actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents have applied since 11 September 2026, and the remaining provisions apply from 11 December 2027. The Act applies to manufacturers of products with digital elements. It does not replace the plant operator's own duty under IEC 61511, but it will shape the product security information you receive.

On 23 October 2026, ISA's Global Cybersecurity Alliance published a summary of its webinar on routes to CRA compliance. Its central message is that risk assessment is the starting point for manufacturers. It also reports that the final EN 62443 standards have not yet been released, and that the third draft was expected in November 2026 or later. For an FSA, the lesson is consistent: whichever side of the supply chain you are on, the assessment is the document the rest depends on.

Handling findings sensibly

An FSA that finds no current security risk assessment should record it clearly and proportionately. State what evidence was requested, what was provided and which clause or lifecycle requirement it relates to. Avoid prescribing the technical fix, because the assessment itself will determine the countermeasures.

Where an assessment exists but is weak, the findings are usually about linkage rather than content:

  • the SIS is not identified separately in the system under consideration;
  • zones are drawn but no SL-T is justified;
  • cyber-initiated scenarios are not carried into the hazard and risk assessment;
  • no trigger links plant change to reassessment.

Key takeaways

  • IEC 61511 Edition 2 requires a security risk assessment to identify the vulnerabilities of the SIS, and an operating-phase FSA can reasonably ask for the evidence.
  • Test three things: the assessment exists for this SIS, it is current against plant changes, and it traces to IEC 62443-3-2 zones, conduits and SL-Ts.
  • The operator is responsible for the assessment. Vendor documents support it but do not replace it.
  • Evidence sits across functional safety, control, OT security and site management, so agree who supplies what before the FSA starts.
  • Regulation such as the EU CRA affects manufacturers, but the common thread is that a risk assessment comes first.

Building the competency on both sides

FSA teams rarely include someone who can read a zone and conduit model, and OT security teams rarely know what an FSA expects to see. The Combined Cyber Security FSRA course brings IEC 62443 and IEC 61511 together around a practical IACS case study. If you need to build or review the assessment itself, the Cyber Security Risk Assessment course works through IEC 62443-3-2 step by step. You can see upcoming dates on the course calendar.